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Abstract
Cooperative missions in Earth orbit
can be facilitated by developing a strategy
to regulate the manner in which vehicles
interact in orbit. One means of implement-
ing such a strategy is to utilize a control
zones technique that assigns different
types of orbital operations to specific
regions of space surrounding a vehicle.
This paper considers the issues associ-
ated with developing a control zones
technique to regulate the interactions of
spacecraft in proximity to a manned
vehicle. It includes discussion of technical
and planning issues, flight hardware and
software issues, mission management
parameters, and other constraints. It
addresses manned and unmanned vehicle
operations, and manual versus automated
flight control. A review of the strategies
utilized by the Apollo Soyuz Test Project
and the Space Station Freedom Program
is also presented.
Introduction
To date, space operations have been
conducted in the absence of a large body
of international regulations. While some
guidelines have been defined in agree-
ments such as the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, each nation has operated accord-
ing to its own priorities and capabilities. As
the number of space-faring nations and
orbiting spacecraft increases, it seems
desirable to develop an international
strategy to coordinate, monitor, and control
the interactions of spacecraft in orbit. Suc-
cessful strategies will facilitate cooperative
operations while supporting each nation's
goals and objectives in space. The poten-
tial benefits of such a strategy include re-
ductions in future program costs and
increases in mission success and safety
through the standardization of space oper-
ations and equipment; increased safety
through development of a coordinated
collision avoidance strategy for active
spacecraft; and the establishment of a
basis for legal and economic compensa-
tion agreements.
Any traffic management concept
should address a number of general re-
quirements. First, the concept should
allow for standardized mission planning
and operations. To facilitate this, the
routine need for long lead time preparation
prior to execution of the mission should be
avoided. Second, the concept should per-
mit standardized flight and ground crew
planning and operations. This standardiza-
tion will simplify training and day-to-day
activity planning. Third, the concept should
allow for early definition of requirements for
communications, tracking, telemetry, and
command and control. Finally, any plan for
coordinating space operations should
provide for collision avoidance between
spacecraft and hold disturbances and con-
tamination from thruster firings to a
reasonable level.
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There are many ways to meet the
requirements outlined above. One means
is to utilize a control zones technique that
assigns different types of orbital operations
to specific regions of space surrounding a
vehicle_. Such a strategy offers the advan-
tage of clearly delineating the responsibility
of both vehicles as a function of their rela-
tive positions, velocities, and time. It is
unambiguous because these quantities can
easily be determined onboard the space-
craft or on the ground using existing tech-
nology. While zone-based strategies can
be utilized to regulate a wide range of
orbital operations, this paper only con-
siders the issues associated with develop-
ing a control zones technique to regulate
the interactions of spacecraft in proximity
to a manned vehicle. However, it should
be noted that many of these same issues
will apply when expanding the control
zones concept to longer ranges and more
classes of spacecraft.
This paper outlines a set of items that
should be considered when developing
international standards for traffic manage-
ment using a zone-based technique. It
then discusses each of these items in
terms of the major issues that will influence
its standardization. Cost implications are
also discussed, where appropriate.
It should be noted that this paper does
not attempt to address the full range of
policy-related questions, such as defining
the legal basis that nations have for estab-
lishing some form of authority over a region
of outer space. It assumes that such ques-
tions will be answered elsewhere. Nor
does it seek to sell the worth of a control
zones strategy. Rather, it assumes that the
international community will recognize the
benefits of such a strategy for at least one
class of orbital vehicles (e.g., space sta-
tions) and develop an appropriate set of
international standards.
Definitions
The following terms will be utilized
throughout this paper and are collected
here to facilitate understanding of the
issues and provide easy reference.
• Rendezvous tarqet- the vehicle that
one is attempting to rendezvous with.
• Control authority - the authority to make
major decisions on the conduct of a
mission, such as aborting the mission.
• Fli.qht crew - the personnel onboard the
manned base.
• Ground crew - the personnel on the
ground who support the premission
preparation and real-time execution of
the manned base's mission.
• Vehicle classes - vehicles that possess
the same basic characteristics and
fulfill the same basic mission. For
example, the Soviet Shuttle Buran and
the American Shuttle Atlantis belong to
the same vehicle class; both are
manned vehicles that ferry crews and
supplies into orbit.
• Teleoperated vehicles - unmanned
vehicles that are remotely piloted during
all or part of their nominal trajectory.
For example, NASA's orbital maneuver-
ing vehicle will utilize a ground-based
pilot to perform docking operations with
the target spacecraft.
• Autonomous vehicles - unmanned
vehicles that execute rendezvous, prox-
imity operations, and docking through
the use of automated flight control tech-
niques and do not nominally require a
remote pilot.
• Zonal authority - the authority granted to
a manned base within a specified
region of space by the international
community. It includes the rules of
operation within such a zone, as devel-
oped by the base vehicle's controlling
nation, program office, or control center
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• Control zones - the regions of space in
which zonal authority is exercised. For
Space Station Freedom, this is called
the "command and control zone"
(Figure 1).
• Manned base - a manned spacecraft
that has been allocated control zones.
• Zonal compliance - meeting the
requirements of a given control zone.
• Transient vehicles - those spacecraft
that enter a given control zone, but do
not nominally plan to interact with the
manned base (e.g., operational
satellites).
• Mission manaqement parameters - For
the purpose of this paper, these are
defined as data that enable ground
controllers and onboard crewmembers
to monitor mission progress and make
decisions in real time. Included in
these data are the nominal mission
plan, preflight determined contingency
plans, real-time status of safety critical
vehicle systems, vehicle state vector
data, etc.
• Interactinq vehicle - any spacecraft that
enters the manned base's control zone.
• Zone activation period - the period of
time when the manned base may exer-
cise its authority over its control zone.
Fig. 1 Space Station Freedom's command and control zone.
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• Dynamic control - to actively pilot a
vehicle.
• Berthinq- the linkup of one orbiting
object with another, wherein the closing
energy is provided in a closely control-
led fashion by an intermediate mechan-
ism attached between the two2. This
mechanism is typically a remote manip-
ulator, such as the Space Shuttle
remote manipulator system.
• Observable parameters - data that can
be obtained through observation of the
interacting vehicle by active (i.e., radar)
means or by passive means (eyeball)
from the manned base without the use
of telemetry.
Historical Precedents
This section summarizes the traffic
management-related elements of Space
Station Freedom and the Apollo Soyuz Test
Project in order to outline the historical
precedents for the remainder of the paper.
The references cited can provide more
information to the interested reader.
Space Station Freedom
Space Station Freedom plans to im-
plement a limited control zones strategy for
regulating its interactions with other space-
craft. This strategy assumes a command
and control zone as shown in Figure 1.
The regulations for this zone designate the
ground as the primary control authority,
until the vehicle enters the control zone.
Then, Freedom becomes the primary con-
trol authority3. While the specific regula-
tions vary as a function of vehicle class,
Freedom has the authority to "wave off"
cooperating manned or unmanned vehicles
operating within the control zone3. For
unmanned vehicles, Freedom will "exer-
cise dynamic control" and have "hazard
critical systems monitoring/command
capabUity"3 while they are inside the
control zone. The unmanned vehicle's
ground control center will serve as a back-
up for Freedom's dynamic control and also
monitor the full set of systems parameters.
In the event of a communications failure
between Freedom and the vehicle, control
will revert to the ground. Alternatively,
when interacting with manned Space
Shuttle Orbiters, Freedom will have two-
way voice communication3, but will rely on
the ground for trajectory and systems
monitoring. It should be noted that regula-
tions have not yet been developed for
manned vehicles other than U.S. Orbiters
(e.g., Hermes or Buran).
Freedom is implementing the neces-
sary communications capabilities to sup-
port these regulations. At the same time,
other vehicles such as the Space Shuttle
Program is developing the necessary
Freedom-compatible interfaces.
Apollo Soyuz Test Project
The Apollo Soyuz Test Project was
among the first instances of cooperative
international space operations. Its purpose
was to dock two manned spacecraft in low
Earth orbit: the American Apollo and the
Soviet Soyuz. The test project did not
utilize a control zones strategy as such.
Rather, it relied on a set of mission-unique
flight rules that were jointly agreed upon
prior to the mission. However, these
mission rules 4 had the same effect (i.e., to
monitor and control the interactions of two
spacecraft in proximity to each other).
Apollo began monitoring the relative
trajectories upon sensor acquisition.
Soyuz served as the rendezvous target
while Apollo performed the actual rendez-
vous maneuvers. The Apollo and Soyuz
ground control centers were the control
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authorities for most of the mission.
However, the spacecraft commanders
exercised controlling authority during the
docking phase. They also exercised
authority if communications were lost with
the ground, or in contingency situations
that required rapid responses. The ground
monitored vehicle health and trajectory,
computed the long-range rendezvous
maneuvers, and coordinated mission
execution. Once within its sensor range,
Apollo computed the necessary rendez-
vous maneuvers (though the ground retain-
ed primary control authority). Apollo and
Soyuz could communicate between them-
selves by voice link and thereby exchange
relevant data, but neither could monitor the
other's telemetry.
Items To Be Considered When Developing
International Standards
Development of a zone-based traffic
management strategy will require the inter-
national community to agree upon a set of
standards that reflect a wide range of tech-
nical disciplines and issues. Such stand-
ards must be specific enough to be useful
for near-term missions, but flexible enough
to serve as a basis for long-term coordina-
tion and cooperation in space. This
section outlines eight areas that should be
considered in developing these standards.
1. First, the community should deter-
mine the classes of spacecraft that should
be assigned control zones. For example,
will only space stations have them, or will
shorter duration orbital missions (e.g.,
space shuttles) also benefit from having
such zones assigned to them?
2. Second, the type of vehicles that
must comply with such zones should be
defined. For example, must satellites
whose orbits occasionally cross a manned
base's zone comply with communications
requirements for that zone?
3. Third, the size of zones allotted to
each class of manned base should be
decided. For example, Space Station
Freedom currently has a control zone that
extends + 37 km (20 n.mi.) horizontally and
+ 37 km (20 n.mi.) vertically (Figure 1).
This zone is + 9 km (5 n.mi.) in the out-of-
plane dimension.
4. Next, the community should agree
upon the regulations that apply to vehicles
operating within a control zone. By anal-
ogy, these are similar to laws governing
commercial air traffic. They regulate which
vehicle is in control at a given time, the
approach corridors to be utilized, mon-
itoring requirements, etc.
5. The community should define the
parameters that a manned base will mon-
itor within its control zone. For example,
will they be limited to trajectory data or will
they include safety-critical systems data for
the interacting vehicle?
6. The duration of each zone's activa-
tion should be determined. For example,
should a vehicle's control zone be active
continuously, or should it only be active
during particular mission phases or opera-
tions?
7. The performance parameters
necessary to ensure compatibility of com-
munications and telemetry should be
considered. These parameters can in-
clude the frequency of operation, polari-
zation, spatial coverage modulation and
demodulation protocols, and system
operational modes.
8. The international community should
specify the tracking parameters and
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measurement accuracies necessary to
assure tracking system compatibility,
While the list just presented is not
comprehensive, it is thought to represent
the scope of the problem. Accordingly,
each item on this list will now be ad-
dressed in a separate section where the
relevant issues are discussed in detail.
Discussion will include its technical and
planning aspects, as well as concerns with
flight hardware and software, mission
management parameters, etc. These
issues, in turn, can be utilized to identify
follow-on studies that will ultimately result in
a set of international standards. Note that
a summary of both the items and their
related issues is presented in Table 1.
Discussion of the Issues
1. Classes of manned spacecraft to be
assi,qned control zones
One advantage of control zones is that
they provide a framework in which to
organize and coordinate on-orbit opera-
tions between programs and nations.
However, it must be noted that joint
missions have been conducted success-
fully in the past without a control zones
strategy (e.g., Apollo Soyuz Test Project).
In such cases, negotiations are conducted
between the nations or parties involved to
determine the physical interfaces, flight
rules, constraints on mission design, and
other details.
Table 1 Summary of standardization items and their related issues
Standardization Re_ated issues*
1. Classes of manned • Number of interactions = f(class of manned vehicle)
vehicles to be assigned • Vehicle das_gn - f(cost to modify)
control zones • Mission design, mission management data = f(standardization)
2. Classes of vehicles that • Apply zone to all veh_clas = f(eost to _mplement, workarounds)
must comply with control • Frequency of interaction = f(cost of mission-unique planning)
zones • Controltabllity = f(manned, unmanned, autonomous)
• Hardware & software - f(vehicle design, zonal regulations, zone saze)
• Planning, m_sslon management data, training = f(interaction, contingency planning, zonal
regulations)
3. Size of zone alloiled to • Safety - f(veh_cle class, trajectory, relative velocities, evasive maneuvers)
each manned base • Base's altitude = f(value of orbit, population)
• Hardware & software, planning, m_ssion management data, traJning = f(zone size, hardware
limitations)
4. Regulations that apply • Apply same rules to all vehicles - f(standardization, cost to comply)
within control zones • Apply rules retroactively = f(hardware impacts)
• Types of regulations; e.g., dynamic control = f(manned, unmanned, communications time
delay, communications link refiabitity, system reliab_hty, decking/berthing, hardware & software)
5. Parameters to be • Regulations, zone size, range
monitored • Monitor only observable parameters = f(manned, unmanned, base's sensor array)
• Monitor telemetry; e.g., safety critical systems data = f(communications link reliability,
hardware & software impacts, ground processing time)
6. Duration of each zone's • Impacts of continuous activation
activation • Impacts on manned base
7. Communications and • Standardized parameters
telemetry compatibility • Manned base's antennae coverage = f(zone regulations, range, relative attitude)
• Level of conformity = f(technology)
• System automation level = f(cost, technology)
8. Tracking compatibility • Sensor type = f(trajectory, zone regulations)
• Standardized parameters = f(tra}ectory, zone regulations)
• The following notation is utilized to explain the related issues:
• Each issue is shown on the left side of the equation and each factor that influences it is shown on the nght side.
• Issue = function of (various factors) = f(factor #1, factor #2, factor #3)
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Therefore, the point to be decided is:
how many interactions must occur over the
program lifetime before the cost of
mission-unique efforts exceed the cost of
conforming to international standards?
One factor is the class of manned vehicle
being considered for a control zone. It is
possible that cost savings for vehicles with
short mission durations (e.g., orbital shut-
tles) may not match savings for vehicles
with longer duration orbital missions (e.g.,
space stations). Trade studies may show
that it is not practical to develop regulations
for more than one class of manned base at
the present time.
Another area that will influence this
decision is vehicle design. It seems rea-
sonable to expect that signatories to an
international agreement will incur additional
short-term program costs to purchase or
develop the flight hardware and software
necessary for compliance. For example,
hardware items such as sensors are prob-
ably required to accomplish any coopera-
tive space activity, and are required
regardless of whether or not international
standards exist. However, additional costs
could occur if the regulations that are
eventually developed require sharing of
that sensor data between the two vehicles.
If the vehicles are already designed or
operating, the costs of new designs and
retrofitting may be prohibitive. However, it
may be possible to design one device that
conforms to international standards and
procure multiple copies of it. Thus, the
nation could realize a long-term savings.
The impact of standards on mission
design, mission management parameters,
constraint development, etc. should also
be considered. Standardization is very
desirable in these areas because of the
amount of work required to generate
mission-unique data products and train
ground and flight crews. This process
could evolve to a point that a standard set
of products is always required to interact
with a given vehicle. That would eliminate
the need to negotiate new products and
data for each rendezvous mission. In a
sense, this is similar to air traffic control. A
controller in London receives a flight plan
with all the necessary information in it
before a French airliner reaches his
airspace.
Note that the significance of these
issues, costs, and savings will vary with the
types of regulations that are eventually
developed for the zones. For example, if
participants agree that direct trajectory
monitoring is not necessary, then a radar
may no longer be needed onboard the
manned base.
2. Classes of vehicles that must comply
with control zones
The international community should
first consider whether a manned base's
control zone should apply to all spacecraft
that enter it, or only to those spacecraft that
intend to interact with the base. For exam-
ple, an operational satellite may enter a
control zone occasionally, but never plan
to interact with the manned base. Estab-
lishing zonal compliance for such vehicle
classes may prove to be an unreasonable
cost impact. This impact is particularly a
concern for manned bases operating at
high altitudes, such as geosynchronous
Earth orbit. Accordingly, the international
community must consider the actual moti-
vation for requiring compliance, and deter-
mine if any valid workarounds exist. For
example, near-term concern for potential
collisions with operational satellites might
be addressed by arranging for some
organization to notify the manned base
when a spacecraft is going to enter its
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vicinity. The manned base could then go
to "alert" status for potential collision
avoidance maneuvers. Then, over the
long-term, the international standards could
be expanded to allocate additional zones
for unmanned vehicles such as satellites.
Manned spacecraft could then be restrict-
ed to operate outside of these zones.
Next, consider the vehicles that will
interact with the manned base. One
means of determining which classes of
these vehicles should be subject to compli-
ance is to consider how frequently the
interactions are expected to occur. Obvi-
ously, the more frequently a spacecraft
enters a manned base's control zone, the
stronger the case for establishing zonal
compliance. Such compliance simplifies
interfaces, enables mission standardiza-
tion, etc., as was discussed in an earlier
section. However, this standardization may
once again require a trade study to deter-
mine how frequently the interactions must
occur before the cost of mission-unique
development and planning exceeds the
cost of standardization.
Another matter that will influence this
decision is the controllability of the space-
craft in question. A spacecraft approach-
ing the manned base must provide an ade-
quate margin of safety for the base's crew.
The question to be decided is what con-
stitutes an adequate safety margin?
Manned vehicles may not be as critical in
this regard as other classes of spacecraft
because a crewmember is a good monitor-
ing system. He/she can see out the
window, adapt to trajectory dispersions,
and make rapid decisions during
contingencies. Since a crewmember's
abilities may provide the necessary safety
margin, one could make a case to exempt
or limit manned vehicle compliance with
such regulations.
The controllability of unmanned
vehicles may be less certain. By their
nature they may represent an increased
threat to a manned base (i.e., there is no
one aboard). Teleoperated vehicles pre-
sent a potential safety hazard during
proximity operations and docking because
of the communications time delays that
slow the pilot's ability to react to disper-
sions and/or contingency situations. An
additional safety concern may occur if the
communications link fails during proximity
operations. In both of these cases, the
incoming vehicle could be relatively uncon-
trolled and on a collision course with the
manned base. Both of these concerns will
be discussed at greater length in section 4
of this paper.
Autonomous vehicles may have less
controllability concerns than other
unmanned vehicles. Once they are tested
and certified, concerns about time delays
may be reduced because everything is
computed and executed onboard. It is still
expected that the manned base's crew will
want to monitor the incoming vehicle's
trajectory and possibly its systems, and
precedent exists for such monitoring. For
example, Soviet cosmonauts monitor the
trajectory of Progress tankers by television
during the final phases of their docking
operations with the Mir Space Station.
In section 1, it was observed that
assigning a control zone to a given man-
ned base might increase its hardware and
software requirements. This increase may
also be true for the classes of vehicles
required to comply with those control
zones. The extent of these impacts will be
a function of the spacecraft capabilities,
the regulations that apply within a control
zone, and the size of the zone. However,
in general, it can be assumed that space-
craft already planning to interact with the
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base will experience less impact from
compliance than transient vehicles. For
example, payloads may already provide
safety critical data to the U.S. Space
Shuttle, so there may be limited impact if
these data must also be provided to a
space station. However, transient vehicles
may require system changes, with the
associated weight, power, and cost penal-
ties, to comply with the zone.
Zonal compliance may also be
expected to increase both the amount of
planning to be done and the mission
management data to be generated. If a
vehicle already plans to interact with the
manned base, then a significant amount of
premission coordination will be conducted
regardless of the existence of a control
zone. The existence of a zone may require
some new data to be generated, but this
should be limited because similar types of
planning data are probably necessary in
either case. However, the manned base
may incur additional planning costs if its
support personnel are required to generate
the plans for interacting vehicle's contin-
gency operations within the control zone.
Finally, depending upon the control zone's
regulations, training may also be expected
to increase. For example, if the manned
base's crew is to monitor the interacting
vehicle's systems data, then they (and
possibly the ground controllers) must be
trained to understand it.
These effects on planning and training
are magnified if transient vehicles are
required to comply with zonal authority. In
this case, the additional coordination and
regulations may represent a significant
planning overhead to these spacecraft,
because they may not have planned to
generate such mission management
parameters.
3. Size of zone allotted to each type of
manned base
Safety requirements may be expected
to have a significant influence on the size
of a manned base's control zone. In short,
the zone must be sized to provide ade-
quate time for the flight crew to recognize a
problem and respond to it. Some of the
many factors that influence this issue are
discussed below. Note that in all cases
described below, it may be difficult to infer
the zone size for an entire class of vehicles
from the results derived from one specific
example. Therefore, sizing studies should
consider several vehicles in the same
class when assigning the manned base's
zone size.
It has been observed that safety
requirements may vary with the class of
vehicle interacting with the manned base.
Accordingly, vehicle class may be ex-
pected to influence zone sizing. For
example, it is possible that detailed risk
assessments may require monitoring of
unmanned vehicles at greater ranges than
a manned vehicle, simply because of the
controllability concerns discussed earlier.
If this proves to be the case, then the
zones must be sized to provide adequate
sensor and communications coverage for
the classes of vehicle in question.
The trajectory followed by the inter-
acting vehicles may also be a factor,
depending on the zone regulations that
develop. For example, zone regulations
may require that the manned base monitor
the critical portions of the interacting
vehicle's trajectory, such as execution of
the intercept maneuver. To do this moni-
toring, the zone should be sized to include
those trajectory phases. This monitoring
was one factor that influenced the sizing of
Space Station Freedom's command and
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controlzone(i.e.,itwassizedtoallow
trackingoftheOrbiterfor1/2orbitpriorto
theinterceptmaneuver).Obviously,the
trajectoryisafunctionofmanythings,
includingtrajectorydispersions,crewactiv-
ityplans,etc.Hence,eachofthesethings
willalsoinfluencezonesizing.
Therelativevelocityoftheapproach-
ingvehiclemustbeconsidered.Thefaster
avehicleapproachesthemannedbase,
thelargerthezonemayneedtobein
ordertoallowthesameamountofmonitor-
ingtime.Thiszonesizemaybelessofa
concernforvehiclesengagedinrendez-
vousanddocking,asrelativevelocitiesare
generallywellcontrolledbythetrajectory
design.However,itmaybeaseriouscon-
siderationifthezonalauthorityextendsto
transientvehiclesuchassatellites.
Safetyshouldconsiderwhetherornot
themannedbaseiscapableofperforming
evasivemaneuvers.Thezone should be
sized to allow adequate time to react to
collision threats. Some of the elements
influencing reaction time are the manned
base's sensor capabilities and the acceler-
ation capability of the interacting vehicle. A
manned base with significant capability to
perform evasive maneuvers can reduce
the reaction time which might reduce zone
sizing. Caution is urged in exercising this
means of reducing zone size, however.
Cooperative aborts will result in two vehi-
cles maneuvering in close proximity to
each other which may raise more safety
concerns than it solves; cooperative aborts
may be much more complex because the
dispersions and failure modes of two vehi-
cles must now be considered. Planning
such maneuvers may increase the pre-
mission planning, training, and system
verification.
Another issue in determining zone size
is the operating altitude of the manned
base. Currently, large volumes of space
exist between various spacecraft in orbit.
However, as the on-orbit population
increases, the competition for available
space can be expected to increase. Such
competition is already evident for satellites
in geostationary orbit. It therefore seems
likely that the international community will
wish to limit the size of zones in order to
ensure equal access to the orbit resource.
Alternatively, such population increases
represent increased activity in the vicinity
of the manned base, and as such, could
be grounds for larger zones, or at least
additional zones with different regulations.
While some issues related to hard-
ware, software, planning, and mission
management parameters have already
been discussed, it is difficult to identify the
full range of such issues and to quantify
their significance in determining zone
sizing. It is probably safe to say that the
larger a zone is, the greater its impact on
these items. For example, monitoring a
large zone may drive additional weight,
volume, and power requirements for equip-
ment such as radar aboard the manned
base. Large zones may also increase pre-
mission planning because more phases of
the trajectory must be examined. This
increased planning will involve more dis-
ciplines to assure zonal compliance.
Monitoring more trajectory phases may
also require additional mission manage-
ment parameters to be developed pre-
mission and monitored in real time. This
additional development will also increase
planning costs and require additional train-
ing. Alternatively, it may not be possible to
increase certain hardware parameters
such as power levels. Thus, hardware lim-
itations may feedback into this process and
limit zone size and shape.
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Finally,proprietary and security con-
cerns may also be expected to influence
zone sizing, but they are outside the scope
of this paper. For example, it is unknown
whether distancing vehicles is an accept-
able means of ensuring proprietary and
national security.
4. Regulations that apply within control
zones
One issue is whether the same regu-
lations should apply to all interacting
vehicles, or should they vary by vehicle
class. Applying the same set of rules to all
interacting vehicles will enhance standard-
ization and may reduce training. However,
it may also drive excessive and unneces-
sary hardware and software development
because it seems unlikely that all vehicles
will require the same level of monitoring.
Thus, standardization in this regard runs
the risk of overspecifying the solution at a
significant increase in implementation cost.
The community should also consider
the worth of retroactively applying the
regulations to existing spacecraft or those
far along in their design cycle. In some
cases there will be only limited conflicts
between the regulation and the vehicle's
current capability. However, other cases
are likely in which the incompatibility and
resulting hardware impacts could be more
extreme. For example, interfacing to
Orbiter avionics in nonstandard ways can
be difficult due to space limitations for
cabling. Hence, some criteria must be de-
veloped to decide when the cost of vehicle
modification outweighs the need for
compliance. Regulations might be
assigned a graduated importance, where
those related to safety critical concerns are
levied on the existing vehicle and others
are addressed by operational workarounds
or waivers. However this is resolved, it
should be noted that there is at least some
precedent for requiring vehicle modifica-
tions to meet new safety standards after
development is under way. Following the
Challenger accident, updated safety
requirements were levied on all payloads
slated to fly on the Orbiter, regardless of
their state of development at the time.
This paper discusses issues rather
than specific proposals. Thus, it does not
discuss specific regulations. However,
there are certain types of regulations that
may be common to various zones. Dis-
cussion will now address the issues asso-
ciated with types of regulations that require
dynamic control, because they are illustra-
tive of issues that may be encountered
when defining the actual regulations and
because they are of specific interest to the
international community.
The community should consider the
necessity for those types of regulations that
require dynamic control of specific vehicle
classes from a manned base. A regulation
of this type might require that the manned
base's personnel remotely pilot the inter-
acting vehicle when it is within the control
zone. Such regulations may be strongly
driven by safety concerns, and are there-
fore a function of vehicle class, system
redundancy, and other factors. There is
probably no need or intent in the inter-
national community to remotely pilot an
interacting manned vehicle. Therefore,
consider the issues that influence the ap-
plicability of this type regulation to various
classes of unmanned vehicles.
One influence could be the existence
of a communications time delay between
the ground-based pilot and the orbiting
spacecraft. This is the case with some
teleoperated vehicles, such as the U.S
orbital maneuvering vehicle. Such time
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delayscan make it difficult for the pilot to
rapidly respond to changes in relative
position and attitude under nominal
conditions, much less contingencies such
as failed-on thrusters. Thus, teleoperation
from the ground could present an in-
creased threat to the manned base and/or
a reduced probability of mission success
for the vehicle. Lower mission success
rates may be unacceptable for operations
involving manned vehicles. However, the
significance of this issue will also be a
function of the minimum translational and
rotational rates that the vehicle can con-
sistently maintain during those operations.
For example, small minimum rates can be
expected to increase the pilot's control
over the trajectory and can also reduce the
amount of DV inadvertently applied in the
event of a failed-on thruster.
Another issue for teleoperated
vehicles is the reliability of the communi-
cations link with the ground. A link that is
unreliable may increase the risk of collision
if it fails at critical points in the trajectory
(e.g., during docking operations) which
could, in turn, drive a need for dynamic
control regulations. However, it may be
possible to reduce the significance of this
issue through vehicle design. For exam-
ple, safety could potentially be improved if
the teleoperated vehicle is designed to
perform automated hold or abort
maneuvers in the event that the link to the
ground fails during critical mission phases.
The U.S. is currently developing such a
capability for its orbital maneuvering
vehicle program5. Two items must be
noted in this regard. First, the success
and acceptability of this type of capability
has yet to be proven, particularly in the
vicinity of manned vehicles. Secondly,
successful automated abort capability will
do nothing to improve the spacecraft's
ability to complete the mission (i.e., the
probability of mission success) in the event
of a link loss. That ability will be a function
of how quickly the ground recovers control
and the orbital mechanics of the problem.
These concerns may not effect auto-
nomous vehicles to the same degree as
they do teleoperated vehicles, since they
will presumably be designed to rendezvous
and dock without nominal ground interven-
tion. Instead, it is the reliability of such
autonomous systems that may dictate the
need for dynamic control. For example, if
the performance of such vehicles is suc-
cessfully demonstrated, crew safety might
be assured by providing an abort com-
mand from the manned base. Presumably,
the spacecraft could back away and the
ground could assess the problem which is
similar to the procedure utilized by the
Soviet Progress Tanker. It should be noted
that it is uncertain what effect such an
abort might have on the probability of
mission success, as this is undoubtably a
function of vehicle capability and the orbital
mechanics.
Dynamic control regulations will also
be influenced by whether the unmanned
vehicle will dock with the manned base, or
be berthed by some manipulator mechan-
ism. Depending upon the reach distance
of the manipulator, berthing may represent
less of a threat to the manned base than
docking. Likewise, it will be influenced by
whether the manned base is capable of
performing evasive maneuvers. Such
capability may also reduce the threat of
collision and the need for dynamic control
regulations.
The hardware and software impacts of
implementing dynamic control must also
be considered because it seems likely that
it will require additional capability on both
vehicles. For example, the manned base
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mayrequirespecialtranslationalandrota-
tionalhandcontrollers,di plays,navigation
andcontrolalgorithms,andtelevision.
However,someofthisequipmentmaybe
requiredregardless,tosuccessfullyper-
formothermonitoringfunctionswithinthe
controlzone.Next,considerthetraining
andplanningimpacts.Dynamiccontrol
regulationswillincreasecrewtraining
requirementsforthemannedbase.In
addition,maintainingthesecrewskillsmay
bedifficultifthedesignatedpilotison-orbit
fora longperiodoftimepriortopilotingthe
unmannedvehicle.Hence,onboard
"refresher"t ainingmayalsoberequired.
Aswasnotedearlier,dynamicontrol
couldalsorequirethemannedbaseorits
groundcrewtoperformcontingencytrajec-
toryplanning.Notethatheseconcerns
maybereducedforautonomousvehiclesif
anabortcommandisutilizedinplaceof
dynamiccontrol.
5. Parameters to be monitored
The community must decide what
types of parameters must be monitored in
order to satisfy safety and mission success
criteria for international missions. These
parameters will be partly a function of the
size and regulations established for a given
zone. As was stated earlier, large zones
may envelop more phases of the trajectory
than small ones which, in turn, may
increase the number of mission manage-
ment parameters to be monitored. In
addition, the type of data to be monitored is
probably a function of the range to the
manned base. Some of the parameters to
be monitored at long ranges [approxi-
mately 50 km (27 n.mi.)] may include
relative position, relative velocity, and
safety critical system status. At closer
ranges, the manned base might also
require relative attitude and direct visual
sighting. Some of the issues associated
with deciding these parameters are
discussed below.
First, will the manned base only mon-
itor those parameters that it can observe
with its own sensors, or will it require tele-
metered parameters (e.g., safety critical
systems data)? Assuming that there is
direct voice contact between the two
spacecraft, this issue may not be critical
for manned vehicles interacting with the
manned base. They have a crew onboard
to monitor most of the same parameters
that would concern the crew of the manned
base. Therefore, consider the issue in
terms of unmanned vehicles.
Some parameters can be obtained
through either observation or telemetry.
For example, relative position can be
determined by the manned base's relative
sensors or by telemetering data from the
interacting vehicle's relative sensors to the
manned base. (Note that the interacting
vehicles may be required to carry some
type of sensing aid, such as corner reflec-
tors or a radar transponder to accomplish
this.) In such a case, the decision of which
source of data to use may be a function of
the sensor array onboard the manned
base. If the manned base has no relative
sensor and if this type of data is critical,
then telemetry may be the only solution.
Other types of data that the manned
base might wish to monitor may only be
obtainable through the interacting vehicle's
telemetry or from the vehicle's ground
control center. Safety critical systems data
are a probable example. Thus, for the
sake of illustrating some of the factors that
influence the issue at hand, the remainder
of this section discusses the need for
safety critical systems data to be moni-
tored onboard the manned base.
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The need to monitor telemetry on-
board the manned base may once again
be a function of the communications link. If
both the interacting vehicle and the man-
ned base have highly reliable links to their
ground control centers, then it may not be
necessary for the manned vehicle to moni-
tor telemetry. However, tile international
community will need to define what consti-
tutes adequate reliability. In addition, it is
possible that a direct communications link
may need to be established between the
manned base and the unmanned vehicle's
control center.
If the communications links are unreli-
able, then lack of monitoring capability on
the manned base may reduce the probabi-
lity of mission success. Certain parame-
ters must be monitored by either the
ground or the manned base before a vehi-
cle will be allowed to approach the base. It
seems unlikely that an unmanned vehicle
would be permitted to continue its
approach if these parameters were not
being monitored. The resulting abort may
be difficult to recover from due to orbital
mechanics, vehicle power limits, etc. In
addition, contingency planning for such an
abort may require additional premission
and real-time planning. However, it may
also be possible to improve communica-
tions redundancy by planning critical mis-
sion phases to occur over ground tracking
sites. Unfortunately, this will add yet
another constraint for rendezvous mission
planners to contend with.
In either case, there will be hardware,
software, and training impacts to be
addressed. For example, if the manned
vehicle does monitor the interacting
vehicle's telemetry, it will need communi-
cations hardware and software, special
displays, crew training to interpret the
displays, etc. Without the telemetry link,
additional control center links (to the
ground tracking sites, etc.) and processing
software may be required. In addition, lack
of telemetry monitoring capability may
require that the unmanned vehicle be
capable of performing automated aborts to
protect against loss of telemetry downlink.
Finally, it should be noted that
significant time delays in processing the
telemetry data on the ground may drive a
need for onboard monitoring even if there
is a reliable ground link. This need will be
a function of the magnitude of the delay
and the particular parameter in question.
Safety critical parameters that can exceed
their safety limits very quickly may still
require onboard monitoring in order to
allow the crew time to react.
6. Duration of each zone's activation
The concept of assigning control
zones to manned spacecraft in orbit is
relatively new and may be expected to
impact both the manned base and the
vehicles that interact with it. It is therefore
prudent to consider whether such zones
should be active continuously, 24 hours
per day and 365 days each year, or
whether they should be active only part of
that time. There appear to be two main
issues in deciding this.
First, what are the impacts on other
spacecraft of having the zones continuous-
ly active? This impact is a function of
many variables, and many of the technical
issues have been discussed elsewhere in
this paper. In summary, it seems reason-
able to state that the more inclusive and
restrictive zonal authority is, the more
desirable it may be to limit the times during
which the zone is active. That is, a large
zone that requires all vehicle classes to
comply with a very strict set of rules will be
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more of an impact to the international
community than one which is not as
inclusive.
Second, what are the impacts to the
manned base and its mission if the zones
do not apply continuously? One could
make a case that the sheer value of space
station-class vehicles may be such that the
sponsoring nations want to maintain some
authority over distances of closest
approach and other factors. For example,
the orbiting elements of Space Station
Freedom may cost on the order of $6
billion, including the cost of their engineer-
ing development. Thus, it may be better to
develop different regulations for noncritical
times than to eliminate or deactivate zones.
In addition, reducing the duration of zone
activation may present proprietary or secu-
rity concerns that are beyond the scope of
this paper.
It is difficult to identify which of the
hardware, software, and mission manage-
ment parameter impacts are most signifi-
cant in this context without having resolved
some of the other issues discussed in this
paper. In addition, there are undoubtably
other factors that will influence this
decision. Therefore, further study is
required before this issue can be resolved.
7. Communications and telemetry
compatibility
Communications and telemetry will be
necessary to execute and monitor opera-
tions within a control zone. The data to be
transmitted during future international
missions may include voice, television, and
data transmission. The first issue to be
considered is the development of a set of
communications standards for use with
control zones. Such standards are neces-
sary for two reasons: (1) to assure the
establishment of a communications link
and (2) to provide uniform and consistent
information transfer and exchange.
Without standards for certain basic
parameters, the communications link
cannot be assured and many operations
and safety considerations could be jeop-
ardized. For example, the international
community should agree upon the radio
frequency of operations for various links
(including space-to-space and space-to-
ground links). Once the frequencies are
allocated, their use should be regulated to
avoid radio frequency interference. It
should be noted that these frequencies can
differ for various links. Another example of
a communications parameter that should
be standardized is polarization. Communi-
cations links can be implemented through
linear, circular, or elliptical polarization
strategies. Accordingly, coordination is
necessary to ensure that the polarization of
the receiving antenna matches that of the
incoming wave. Similar design considera-
tions apply to each communication link and
system parameter, indicating the need for
standardization to support cooperative
international operations. Other such pa-
rameters include data rates, link margins,
signal-to-noise ratio, radio frequency
interference, modulation and demodulation
protocols, and operational modes (simplex,
duplex, and multiplex). Discussions lead-
ing to communications protocols for
assured links should lead to an acceptable
and cost-effective communications and
telemetry system design to be utilized by
the international community.
Standardization should also extend to
parameters that affect the processing of
information once the communications link
is established. These parameters include
carrier frequencies, data formats, and
coding/decoding schemes. For example,
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anytelemetrydatareceivedmustbe
decodedbeforethedatacanbeutilizedby
thesystem onitoringorcommand
processingsoftwareonboardthevehicle.
Inthepast,issuesrelatedtoinformation
exchangehavebeenaddressedbythe
InternationalTe ecommunicationsUnion
andtheConsultiveCommitteeforSpace
DataSystems.Atthepresenttime,infor-
mationstandardssuchastheConsultive
Committeeareemergingworldwideand
thesemayinfluencethedevelopmentof
internationalstandardsforcontrolzones.
Thematterofadequateantennae
coverager quiredonboardthemanned
baseshouldalsobeaddressed.Depend-
ingonthezonalregulations,coverage
requirementsforcommunicationsa d
telemetrymaybeafunctionofrange(see
section5).Ensuringcommunications
coverageatverycloserangescanbe
moredifficultthanlongerranges,because
therelativeattitudeofthevehicles
becomesamoredominantfactor.Omni-
directionalantennaecoveragecouldbe
utilizedtoassurepropercoverageatshort
ranges;however,itseemsimpracticalto
implementthisforanentirecontrolzone.
Variousolutionscanbeenvisioned.For
example,asinglecontrolzonecouldbe
dividedintoseveralcommunications
regions.Oneregionmightincludethe
spacewithinafewhundredmetersofthe
mannedbaseandtheothermightextend
fromthisnearegiontoafewtensof
kilometers.Then,omnidirectionalanten-
naecoveragecouldbespecifiedforthe
innermostregionwithoutsevereimpactsto
thecommunicationsa dtelemetrysystem
design.Withoutsuchastrategy,the
interactingvehiclemaybeconstrainedto
approachwithinaspecificoneorregion
inordertofullycommunicatewiththe
mannedbase.Thisapproachinturn.
couldresultinundesirabler strictionson
theinteractingvehicle'strajectory.Also,if
severalpproachregionsareimplemen-
ted,eachlinkmayneedtoutilizea
separateantennatoprovideadequate
coverage.Theseconsiderationsare
importantforuniformityofcommunications
andtelemetrys stemdesignsforthe
internationalcommunity.
Another issue is determining at what
level communications conformity should be
required. The communications hardware
implementations utilized by various nations
have evolved differently depending on their
needs and technological advancement.
One obvious step to communications and
telemetry conformity would be to specify
hardware designs and subsystems. How-
ever, this approach could lead to technol-
ogy transfer issues and concerns. On the
other hand, specification of hardware
function and the resultant overall commu-
nications and telemetry performance would
alleviate these concerns. For example,
instead of specifying a distributed array
antenna with an agile beam, one can
specify the spatial and spectral coverage,
and gain of the antenna and allow the
implementing nation to decide an antenna
configuration and type.
The international community should
also determine what level of communica-
tions and telemetry system automation is
required. Such automation allows fault
detection and recovery and selection of the
appropriate assets (e.g., receivers,
antennae, transmitters) for various links.
Coordination is necessary to ensure that a
vehicle with automated features (e.g.,
selection of gains) implements the capabil-
ities necessary to interact with vehicles that
perform such functions manually. Note
that this type of automated operational
capability is currently being developed for
possible implementation in Space Station
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Freedom's communication and tracking
subsystem. However, increased automa-
tion could increase the cost of hardware
and software system development. The
software resident on the communications
and telemetry system should also be
considered for mutual acceptance. Such
standardization would be beneficial in the
reduction of estimated program costs and
could assist in contingency situations. It
may also present technology transfer
questions that are beyond the scope of this
paper.
8. Trackin,q compatibility
Two issues should be addressed in
order to achieve tracking compatibility.
They are discussed together because they
are functions of many of the same factors.
First, the types of sensors that will be
utilized within a control zone should be
agreed upon. Second, a set of standards
should be developed for the system
operation parameters and hardware
specifications. Table 2 is an example of
specifications that have been proposed for
the sensors to be utilized in U.S. space
operationsS. Other specifications could
include the bands of operation, polariza-
Table 2 Proposed specifications for sensors used in
U.S. space operations7
System reliability
System weight
System power
Range resolution
Range rate resolution
Bearing resolution
>0.9999
<35 kg (77 Ib)
< 150 watts
<0.5 cm (.2 in)(0 - I kin)
_'1% R (1 - 100 km)
_<0.3cm/sec (0 - 1 km)
_<0.002R1/3 (1 - 100 km)
-<2 deg/R1/3 (0 - 1 km)
-<0.05deg (t - 100 km)
Bearing rate resolution _<0.1/R1/2 deg/sec (0 - I kin)
_<0.002deg/sec (1 - 100 km)
Sensor sample rate >_10 samples per sec
tion, look angles, coverage, data rates,
field-of-view, and data formats.
The specific accuracies and types of
data required to meet nominal and con-
tingency trajectory and control zones
requirements will influence each of these
issues. Consider the choice of sensors.
The Apollo Soyuz ranging and tracking
equipment included optical, television,
radar, docking targets, and lights. Future
missions envision the use of these and
other sensors. For example, infrared sys-
tems may be necessary for vehicle detec-
tion in the absence of natural or artificial
light (e.g., during the dark portions of an
orbit). Laser vision and laser radars are
useful for determining position, velocity,
and attitude with extremely high accuracy.
This equipment may be required to support
some docking operations. Hardware
standards are similarly affected by the
operational requirements. Therefore, a
concerted effort should be made to
standardize ranging and tracking require-
ments for international operations. These
standardized requirements would simplify
the definition of the other tracking issues.
Finally, technological advances such
as automatic operation and fault tolerance
will eventually become available and be
implemented. These hardware implemen-
tations can result in technology transfer
issues and concerns that must be
addressed.
Conclusions
A control zones concept will provide a
consistent foundation and an integrated
framework for the development and
conduct of international space operations.
Initially, it can be utilized to coordinate
various types of unmanned activities. The
consistent framework provided by such a
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strategywillalsosupportearly definition of
requirements for international missions.
For example, the concept originally
adopted for Space Station Freedom has
assisted requirements definition for
Europe's Man-Tended Free-Flyer.
This paper identified a broad range of
issues to be considered in developing a
control zones strategy. At this point it is
prudent to mention some additional areas
for future consideration. First, considering
the high cost of activities in space, the
international community may wish to define 1.
what parameters constitute grounds for
aborting a mission (when they exceed their
nominal ranges). Second, the issues
discussed herein only considered contin-
gencies for the interactinq vehicles. The
community should also evaluate the need 2.
for control zones when the manned base
suffers a failure. Specifically, do zones
offer any benefits then and how would the
regulations change as a result? Third, this 3.
paper focussed primarily on the orbiting
spacecraft themselves. However, some of
the decisions to be made when establish-
ing control zones may be influenced by
impacts to existing ground facilities.
Factors such as control center interfaces 4.
with other facilities must ultimately be
considered.
Next, the community should examine
the benefits of developing a set of stand- 5.
ards for systems redundancy. For
example, unmanned vehicles that were
designed to operate with only other
unmanned vehicles may not be redundant
enough to satisfy safety requirements for
docking with manned spacecraft. Under
these circumstances, the requirements 7.
could be met by upgrading the unmanned
vehicle or, conceivably, by adding the
redundancy to the manned base or the
ground. The availability of such standards
could reduce future retrofitting of systems
by specifying whose responsibility it is to
provide adequate redundancy early in a
program's design cycle. Finally, how
could control zones be modified to support
lunar bases and Mars missions? For
example, it might be beneficial to assign a
parking orbit zone as a holding orbit for
freighters carrying lunar materials to Earth
orbit.
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